Why We May Lose the War in Iraq
Sun August 7th, 2005 12:29 MSTThe war in Iraq, improperly called an insurgency, is a complex kind of war - one which allows the enemy to achieve greater effect with fewer combatants. In a guerilla war, the tactic is to overthrow the government with the support of a significant part of the populace. Democracy’s enemies in this war have instead a two-stage goal of first driving out foreign protectors with terrorism. and then triggering a conventional civil war. Because of this, competitors for the spoils - Iran, Iraqi Baathists in Syria, Al Qaeda and the Syrian regime all have the same goals for the first stage, with each hoping to win or gain spoils when their proxies fight each other in the second stage.
Their first stage tactics are primarily terrorist, with some small unit ambushes and attacks. They seek to drive out the democratic protectors of Iraq (primarily the US) by causing a continuous stream of casualties, even at a relatively low level. They seek to demoralize, confuse and enrage the Iraqis, triggering anarchy leading to civil war. Thus they using terrorist attacks against coalition forces, government officials, security forces, and reconstruction personnel, while killing large numbers of civilians.
Terrorism is unusually effective as a tactic because it is a cheap but significant force multiplier. Small numbers of readily replaceable terrorists, often not even trained (in the case of car bombs) or with minimal training (in the case of IED installation and detonation) can kill a much larger number of their enemy. Thugs can operate as assassins and kill important individuals, disrupting reconstruction efforts and the new government.
By using small weapons such as powerful mines, small numbers of terrorists can kill many Americans (i.e. they have a remarkable “force multiplier”). The new Iranian engineeried IED’s - now a misnomer - is an example of how the enemy strategy is evolving. Almost impregnable (to IEDs) marine armored troop carriers are death traps when attacked by the new weapons. One of these devices killed 14 marines last week. Some have been intercepted at Iranian border crossings, and the weapons are not improvised - they have machined parts and are engineered by experts specifically to attack armored vehicles. Notably, it is likely that these Iranian produced weapons are being supplied to Sunni and perhaps Al Qaeda terrorists in Iraq, even though the Sunnis are Iran’s proxy enemy in the second stage.
While comparisons with Vietnam are always dangerous, there is are at least two important lessons that should be applied to Iraq. Although we won the war in South Vietnam at least twice militarily, it was at great cost. This was because we failed to cut the supply lines from the base of the enemy - North Vietnam, and failed to adequately wage war against the enemy base. General Giap, overall enemy commander, later said that cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos would have quickly defeated the communist side because of the vast amount of material needed to support a guerilla war). The second victory was achieved by removing most restrictions on attacks against the enemy base, blockading their sea supply routes with mines and bombing them into submission. This took only 12 days.
In Iraq, we have a much worse enemy interdiction problem. Terrorists and increasingly lethal weapons are arriving from two neighborint enemy bases via long, porous borders - Syria and Iran. The enemy logistical lines cannot be cut by patrolling the borders because the material and personnel that must get through are much less and the borders much longer.
The malefactors listed above are all at war with the coalition and Iraq, using terrorism in Iraq and in coalition countries. Syria and Iran are allies, in the first stage of the Iraq war, with those who attacked the heart of the United States on 9/11 and on 7/7 the heart of England. The latter was clearly an extension of the Iraq war, with a stated purpose to drive Britain out of Iraq.They are this war’s equivalent to North Vietnam, except we haven’t attacked them at all.
In this age of asymmetrical warfare and terrorism, they should be treated as wartime enemies, with all the measures that implies. Not to do so may lead to the loss of war in Iraq and ultimately an ever increased threat of nuclear megaterrorism in our homelands which could literally destroy our economies, kill tens of millions of our citizens, and perhaps cost the west forever its preminent economic and military position, while an undamaged China gains hegemony.